




Can internal swap markets enhance welfare in defined contribution plans?
Cui, J.; Ponds, E.H.M.
Published in:
Rotman International Journal of Pension Management
Publication date:
2010
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Cui, J., & Ponds, E. H. M. (2010). Can internal swap markets enhance welfare in defined contribution plans?
Rotman International Journal of Pension Management, 33(2), 52-58.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Jiajia Cui is Assistant Professor
at University of Amsterdam,
and research fellow at Netspar.
Eduard Ponds is head of pensions
research and innovation at
Algemene Pensioen Groep
(APG). He holds the Chair of
Economics of Collective Pension
Plans at Tilburg University and
Netspar (Netherlands). Their
work was supported by a grant
from the Rotman International
Centre of Pension Management.
Volume 3 • Issue 2
Fall 2010
Jiajia Cui and Eduard Ponds
Rotman International Journal
of Pension Management
There is a worldwide trend to substitute defined contribution pension plans for
defined benefit plans, which are typically indexed to wage or price inflation. A
problem with this development is that participants in defined contribution plans
have limited access or no access at all to inflation-linked assets, especially wage
inflation-linked claims. This article demonstrates that the creation of an internal
market that swaps equity-related returns for wage inflation-linked income
streams helps to overcome the market incompleteness regarding wage-linked
securities. The result is an improvement in the welfare of both younger and
older defined contribution plan members.
Keywords: Defined Contribution Plan, Internal Swap Market, Life-Cycle Theory, Pension Fund, Wage-
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Implications of the Move to Defined
Contribution Plans
The worldwide importance of individual defined
contribution (DC) pension plans has grown substantially. This
has come at the expense of the relative significance of social
security and private sector funded defined benefit (DB) plans.
DB plan benefits in retirement are based on the number of years
of contribution and a reference wage, which is often related to
an individual's own past wages. Moreover, during retirement,
benefits may be indexed for a reference variable, for example
wage growth or price inflation. Whereas DB plans are tightly
linked to wages, pensions from DC plans depend on capital
market returns. The sum of contributions plus investment
proceeds on these contributions determines pension wealth
at retirement. This pension wealth should ideally be converted
into annuities (Yaari 1965; Davidoff et al. 2005).
Viewed from the perspective of life-cycle investment theory
(Bodie et al., 2007), there are a number of disadvantages to
this move away from wage-related pension benefits in favor
of return-related benefits:
• Wage-indexed DB plans overcome the serious market
incompleteness regarding the lack in supply of wage-
indexed or price-indexed bonds.
• DB plans have different risk-return characteristics than
DC plans, so a portfolio of retirement income provisions
consisting of both DB and DC plans may be welfare-improving
as retirement income does not rely on either wage growth of
capital market performance but on a combination (Matsen
and Thogerson, 2004).
• Wage-indexed DB plans organize intergenerational risk-sharing
because pensioners can benefit from maintaining purchasing
power. In funded schemes with well-organized intergenerational
risk sharing, the young and the old may benefit from more
risk taking in capital markets because of the extension of
the investment horizon (Cui et al., 2010; Gollier 2008).
We propose the creation of an internal market of wage-linked
swaps, where the aggregate growth rates of wages can be
exchanged for risky (equity) returns.
The Idea of an Internal Swap Market
The traders in this swap market are young and old individuals
who are saving, or have saved, for retirement income via DC
plans. This internal market can be organized for workers who
are covered by the same terms of employment including the
pension plan, (e.g. a specific group of professionals such as
physicians or lawyers). A one-year swap contract could be
implemented with voluntary participation. Every year, contract
terms would be renegotiable. We develop a life-cycle model
to determine the risk premiums for different cohorts and
consequently the optimal age-related exposure to such swaps,
in addition to the conventional asset allocation.1,2
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We show that the internal market of wage-linked swaps can be
an ideal construction to achieve intergenerational risk-sharing
between young and old plan members, and to simultaneously
create optimal life-cycle exposures for all members. It also
helps to complete the missing market of wage-linked securities,
and to relax the borrowing constraints of young members.
The largest welfare gains are achieved if employers require
mandatory participation in these swap contracts over long
periods (e.g. throughout one's career).
The remainder of this article describes a pension plan design
with variable annuities. From there, it investigates whether or
not the participants of different ages have incentives to engage
in a return-wage swap arrangement. The conclusion is that
younger and older workers likely prefer different levels of
return-wage swaps, therefore creating trading possibilities for
welfare improvement. A pricing protocol is developed which
converts the incentives into the fair price of such a swap and
the market clearing condition. The article concludes that this
swap protocol could be the basis for a win-win outcome for
both younger and older workers.
Pension Plan Design
We analyze a pension plan with a variable annuity structure
that is offered to a group of employees. The plan members
contribute a fraction of their wage income into the plan for
every year of service. Contributions are used to acquire
deferred variable annuities paying out during retirement.
If the contributions are invested only in (nominal) risk-free
assets, then effectively each unit of contribution buys a
certain quantity of deferred annuity at the market nominal
rate of interest.
Let Pt,x stand for the contribution made at time t when a plan
member is of age x, Rf for the nominal risk-free rate, and kpx
the survival probability. The equation below relates the
contribution to the present value of a deferred annuity with
a payment level of :
(1)
When the contributions for each year are invested in nominal
riskfree assets, then income upon retirement is equal to the
fixed amount of .
In practice, the assets backing these acquired deferred annuities
are often invested in the risky assets, so that the participants
have prospect on earning (equity) risk premiums, given
their risk appetite. We capture this by adjusting yearly the
benefits from the variable annuities for the excess return
of realized investment return over the risk-free rate. Let
reflect the benefits with adjustments, at retirement T the
bought deferred annuity in year t, which amounts to:
` (2)
where RsP is the return on the portfolio. Upon retirement, the
total benefit paid out is:
(3)
Investments are held in a broadly diversified portfolio of
stocks and nominal bonds. Only plan members are exposed to
investment risk. They are insured for diversifiable mortality
risk (on an intra-cohort base).
Internal Swap Incentives
The collective portfolio of stocks and bonds may not be the
optimal portfolio when one takes into account wage growth
uncertainty. Life-cycle theory indicates that the total wealth
of the younger cohorts consists primarily of human capital,
whereas the older cohorts have a relatively large position in
financial capital and a decreasing value of human capital.
Adding wage-linked assets to the portfolio may be better
from the perspective of risk diversification and wage
inflation protection.
Young and old likely have opposite preferences as to wage-
linked assets where they are available. The younger cohorts
will probably prefer a short position in wage-linked assets as
they are overexposed to wage growth risk, whereas the older
cohorts will look for a long position in wage-linked assets to
offset the high exposure to financial market risk. However the
supply of the price inflation-linked assets is limited in financial
markets and wage-linked securities are not yet available.
As younger workers are natural suppliers of wage-linked
securities, older workers are natural demanders of these assets.
In the next section we test whether young and old employees
have incentives to trade wage-linked return for capital market
return. We construct an internal market which is accessible to
employees covered by the plan and these individuals trade
wage-linked swaps.
We derive the preferred wage-linked positions by the various
cohorts with help of the expression below, wherein αx is the
preferred holding of financial wealth in the available portfolio
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of stocks and bonds, the complement 1-αx the preferred
holding in wage-linked assets, and ws denotes the rate of
wage inflation.
(4)
Note when αx=1, then the adjustment in the value of the
deferred annuities is purely driven by financial returns and
when αx=0, then the adjustments are purely linked to wage
growth. For the younger cohorts it might be that the preferred
α is larger than one, αx >1, meaning they wish to acquire extra
financial returns by shorting the wage growth exposure.
Employee Preferences
In order to explore the existence of incentives, we use a welfare
measure, which is defined by the preferences of individuals. The
benefits are in nominal terms. However, the participants have
preferences in real benefits. During the working period, net-
income is gross wage minus pension contributions .
Upon retirement, income is equal to the payout of the benefits
(B65). The preference of the employee is defined by the expected
utility of wage-deflated income. Individuals evaluate retirement
income in a real framework deflated by wage growth.
where WT denotes wage inflation index upon retirement:
Since the choice of the values of α has no impact on the before-
retirement net-income, the preference can be simplified to the
expected utility over retirement income. The optimization
problem is equivalent to:
(5)
The welfare level is measured by real certainty equivalent





The illustrative CEB-α curve below illustrates the incentives
of different age cohorts to swap. Younger workers do hold
variable annuities in market portfolio (α=1) but they might
prefer more of them (α>1). That is, they want to sell wage
growth risk in order to buy additional asset returns. At the
same time, older workers also hold variable annuities in market
portfolio (α=1), but they might prefer to hold less (α<1). Thus
they want to buy wage growth risk and to sell asset return.
Actual Results
The results discussed below assume an economy with an equity
premium of 5%, average nominal risk-free rate of 3%, average
portfolio (60% in equities) excess return of 3%, and average
wage growth of 2%. The volatility of equity returns is set at
15% per year and wage growth volatility at 1.5% per year. The
correlation between wage growth and equity returns is a small
but positive 0.1 With these assumptions, do participants have
different preferences regarding their exposure to financial returns
and wage growth? If so, do they have incentive to swap the
financial returns and wage growth exposures with each other?
Figure 2 shows the different return exposures and the calculated
welfare improvements for employees aged 35 to 60; the CEB-α
curves are hump shaped. We see clearly the most preferred
return exposure of the young is larger than that of the older
cohorts. For instance, the 35-year-old prefers α=130% exposure
to return indexation and hence negative 30% in wage indexation.
The 60-year-old and retirees prefer about 50% exposure to











return indexation and 50% in wage indexation. This result is
consistent with the life-cycle theory: younger cohorts prefer
to be overexposed to financial returns because of their human
capital. This can be seen from the benefit equation (4). Part of
young employees’ benefit accruals come from the to-be-earned
salary incomes and therefore have a large position in wage
growth and wage risk.
Older workers have a relatively small position in wage growth
exposure compared to their financial wealth and they may
benefit from selling return risk in order to increase wage
growth return and risk exposure. For example, the 60-year-
old individual prefers a portfolio of 50% in financial return
exposure and 50% in wage return exposure. These figures
indicate that it is possible to improve the exposures of different
cohorts by setting up an internal swap market, which results
in age-dependent indexation policy.
A Market-Clearing Mechanism
Although the above results are intuitive, a drawback is that
the α parameter is fixed during the remaining working
period of the young. With this condition, in a certain period
of time, all future cohorts and current young members would
demand more financial returns, but there will be little or no
supply. Therefore, a scheme with fixed α is not sustainable.
Thus we must make α age-dependent: making it decline with
age. Our previous results will still hold in that there will still
be incentives to swap. However, we now incorporate a market
clearing condition to equalize the supply and demand.
Consider the case, for example, where there is more demand
for wage-linked claims from the older cohorts than the total
supply from the younger cohorts. To clear the market, younger
workers must be compensated to motivate them to provide
more wage-linked claims in exchange of extra financial risks.
There are several ways of providing such compensation. One
possibility is that the net suppliers invest the cash compensa-
tion into risky assets in order to boost their future retirement
benefit payments. 3 We have shown above that, if wage-linked
claims were available, the benefits could be:
(8)
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Figure 2: The CEB-α Curve for Employees of Age 35, 40, 45, 50, 55 and 60*
Source: Authors’ calculations.
* With assumed risk aversion γ=10. The maturity of the swaps equals the remaining working life (n=65-x).
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With positive compensation per unit of risk-taking (c>0)
to boost future benefit payments, the risk exposure can be
modified as follows:
(9)
When αt-1>0 the person acts as a net supplier and is
compensated, and when αt-1<0 the person is a net demander
and pays for it. The compensation, c, is determined by a
numerical grid search, jointly with the shape of αx, so that
the preference of each cohort is optimized, and the optimized
welfare level is higher than, or equal to, the case with pure
financial exposures.
We also incorporate a market clearing condition so that the
sum of the total wage-linked claims offered by the younger
cohorts equal the total wage-linked claims demanded by
the older cohorts, in each period for the coexisting working
participants.
(10)
where Lx denotes the asset under management per age
cohort, and Nx denotes the population size of each cohort.
Here we study a stationary situation where the cohorts are
of equal size.
Findings
Figure 3 shows the pattern of α x, which decreases with age.
Prior to age 52, workers are suppliers of wage-linked claims
and after age 52, they are receivers of wage-linked claims. The
magnitude of the compensation is approximately five basis
points per one percentage point increase of extra risk taking.
The resulting pay-off scheme is summarized in Table 1. Because
of the decline of αx with age, the expected total excess return
from the variable annuity also declines with age. After age 52,
the expected excess return is lower than the excess return of the
financial assets. However, the older employees receive the desired
less volatile wage growth. The last column shows the average
supply (-) or demand (+) of wage-linked claims per age cohort,
relative to the size of the total assets under management. Each
year, the variable annuity participants have the opportunity to
renegotiate whether to extend the internal swap for the next year.4
If the internal swap is able to continue operating, then the resulting
welfare improvements for some age cohorts, relative to the welfare
levels obtained without any swap (i.e., α=1 in Figure 2), are shown
in Table 2. With appropriate compensation for risk, the internal
swap market improves the welfare of the participants, especially the
younger members. The older cohorts reach break-even at a reduced
level of demand for wage-linked claims. These welfare gains could
be reached through mandatory participation in the swap contract
over extended periods of time (e.g. throughout workers’ careers).
Table 1: The Pay-Off Scheme
Age α α * E [Re ] (1 - α) E [w ] (α - 1) c E [Return] Supply (-) or Demand (+)
25 2.1 6.2% - 2.1% 0.53% 4.6% - 0.001%
35 1.7 5.0% - 1.3% 0.33% 4.0% - 0.014%
45 1.3 3.8% - 0.6% 0.14% 3.4% -0.013%
50 1.1 3.3% - 0.2% 0.04% 3.1% - 0.005%
55 0.9 2.7% 0.2% - 0.05% 2.8% + 0.008%
60 0.7 2.1% 0.6% - 0.15% 2.6% + 0.029%
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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A Win-Win Solution
There is a global trend to substitute funded DC pension plans
for price-indexed and wage-indexed DB plans. However
participants in DC plans have limited, or no access to inflation-
linked assets, especially wage inflation-linked claims. But
different age cohorts have different exposure to the wage
growth potential captured in their human capital position.
This creates the opportunity to trade wage growth for
financial returns.
We show that the creation of an internal swap market helps
to overcome the market incompleteness regarding wage-
linked securities, and hence improves welfare for DC scheme
members. We find the young are able to offset their high
exposure to wage growth and increase their exposure to
capital market return, and older workers replace full exposure
to financial markets by a combination of wage and capital
market returns. This reallocation of risk exposures over the
ages is in line with the recommendations of life-cycle theory
of personal finance.
Endnotes
1. The authors acknowledge ICPM for the research grant. The authors are
very grateful for the helpful comments by David Blake, Dirk Broeders,
Barbara Zvan, Malcolm Hamilton, and seminar participants at the
Rotman ICPM Discussion Forum in Toronto, June 9-10, 2010.
2. The valuation of wage-linked claims in incomplete market setting is
discussed in De Jong (2008).
3. Another possibility is that the net demanders (e.g. older cohorts) pay a
certain amount of cash to the net suppliers (e.g. the younger cohorts) up
front for the future wage-linked claims. The net suppliers consume the
cash compensation immediately.
4. The internal market might break down if certain cohorts do not have
sufficient incentive to participate (e.g. due to mismatch between supply
and demand, varying sizes of cohorts, etc).
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